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STATE ADJUDICATORY JURISDICTION OVER
NONRESIDENT DEFENDANTS
"We recognize that [the minimum contacts standard]. . . is one in
which few answers will be written 'in black and white. The greys are
dominant and even among them the shades are innumerable.' ""
I. INTRODUCTION
In an attempt to clarify the confusion that existed among the high-
est courts of several states concerning the extent to which a state may
assert jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, the United States
Supreme Court recently decided the cases of World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson2 and Rush v. Savchuk.3 The Court reversed both
the Oklahoma Supreme Court and the Minnesota Supreme Court,
finding that the states' assertion of jurisdiction exceeded the limits per-
mitted by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the
United States Constitution.4
In World- Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, the issue before the
Court was whether the fourteenth amendment's due process clause al-
lows a state court to assert in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident
automobile retailer and its distributor on the basis that it was foresee-
able that the automobiles they sold and distributed would be used in
the forum state.5
In Rush v. Savchuk, the issue presented to the Court was "whether
a state may constitutionally exercise quasi in rem jurisdiction over a
defendant who has no forum contacts by attaching the contractual obli-
gation of an insurer licensed to do business in the state to defend and
indemnify him in connection with the suit."6
This comment will determine, in light of these two recent deci-
sions, the due process limitation on a state court's power to assert juris-
1. Kulko v. California Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978) (quoting Estin v. Estin, 334
U.S. 541, 545 (1948)).
2. 100 S.Ct. 559 (1980).
3. 100 S.Ct. 571 (1980).
4. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 100 S.Ct. 559, 568 (1980); Rush v. Savchuk,
100 S.Ct. 559, 568 (1980); Rush v. Savchuk, 100 S.Ct. 571, 580 (1980).
5. 100 S.Ct. at 562.
6. 100 S.Ct. at 574.
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diction. To make this determination, the evolution of the due process
limitation on jurisdiction will be examined. This examination will fo-
cus on the cases that have adopted the foreseeability concept as a basis
for in personam jurisdiction and on those cases concerning quasi in
rem jurisdiction that have relied on the principles set down in Seider v.
Roth.7 Following this examination, consideration will be given to a
line of Supreme Court cases from which three tests for determining
jurisdiction have emerged. These are the relationship or nexus test, the
fair warning test, and the convenience test. These three tests will then
be used to analyze the World- Wide Volkswagon and Rush cases.
II. FACTS
A. The World-Wide Case
The Robinsons purchased a new automobile from Seaway Volk-
swagen in New York. The next year, Mrs. Robinson, while driving
through Oklahoma en route from New York to Arizona, was struck
from behind. Mrs. Robinson and her children were seriously injured in
the collision when the gasoline tank of their automobile ruptured, caus-
ing a fire in the passenger compartment.
Products liability actions were filed in Oklahoma by the Robin-
sons who joined as defendants the automobile's manufacturer, its im-
porter, its retail dealer, and its regional distributor (World-Wide
Volkswagen Corporation). At trial, World-Wide made a special ap-
pearance, claiming that Oklahoma's assertion of jurisdiction was in vi-
olation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The
trial court rejected World-Wide's claim. World-Wide then petitioned
the Oklahoma Supreme Court to assume original jurisdiction and issue
a writ of prohibition8 restraining the trial judge from exercising juris-
diction over World-Wide. The Oklahoma Supreme Court denied the
writ, holding that the exercise of in personam jurisdiction was author-
7. 17 N.Y.2d II1, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
8. The writ of prohibition is a prerogative writ of ancient origin, and should be used
with caution and forbearance for the furtherance of justice, and for securing order and
regularity in and among inferior tribunals, where there is no other adequate remedy. It
is an extraordinary judicial writ, issuing out of a court of superior jurisdiction, and di-
rected to an inferior tribunal, for the purpose of preventing the inferior tribunal from
usurping a jurisdiction with which it is not legally vested.
Hirsh v. Twyford, 40 Okla. 220, 223, 139 P. 313, 315 (1913). The authority for issuing the writ of
prohibition is found in the Oklahoma Constitution. OKLA. CONsT. art. 7, § 4.
[Vol. 15:827
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ized by its long-arm statute.9 The court found that the trial court's as-
sertion of jurisdiction comported with constitutional due process
limitations, owing to the mobile characteristics of the automobile and
the fact that the petitioners could have foreseen that their acts or omis-
sions outside Oklahoma might cause tortious injury within
Oklahoma. to
B. The Rush Case
Two Indiana residents were involved in a single-car accident in
Indiana. The driver of the car was Rush. Savchuk, a passenger, was
injured in the accident. Shortly after the accident, Savchuk moved to
Minnesota and later commenced an action against Rush in a Minne-
sota state court. The car involved was insured by State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm) under a liability policy
issued in Indiana. State Farm did business in all fifty states. Savchuk,
pursuant to a Minnesota garnishment statute, attempted to obtain quasi
in rem jurisdiction over Rush by garnishing State Farm's obligation
under the insurance policy. State Farm denied owing any debt to Rush
and claimed, therefore, that there was nothing to attach for quasi in
rem jurisdiction. Rush and State Farm moved to dismiss the complaint
owing to a lack of jurisdiction. The trial court denied the motion. On
appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court, while expressly stating that
Rush did not have the requisite minimum contacts to justify in per-
sonam jurisdiction,"I affirmed the trial court decision. The court held:
[A]n automobile insurance company's obligation to defend
and indemnify its insured is a res subject to prejudgment gar-
nishment for the purpose of obtaining quasi in rem jurisdic-
tion when the incident giving rise to the action occurs outside
9. World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 585 P.2d 351, 353, 355 (Okla. 1978). The
Oklahoma long-arm statute provides as follows:
A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts directly or by an
agent, as to a cause of action or claim for relief arising from the person's ... causing
tortious injury in this state by an act or omission outside this state if he ... derives
substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered, in this state
OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1701.03(a)(4) (1971).
10. "[T]he product being sold and distributed by the petitioners is by its very design and
purpose so mobile that petitioners can foresee its possible use in Oklahoma. . . .The
evidence presented below demonstrated that goods sold and distributed by the petition-
ers were used in the State of Oklahoma, and under the facts we believe it reasonable to
infer, given the retail value of the automobile, that petitioners derive substantial income
from automobiles which from time to time are used in the State of Oklahoma."
585 P.2d at 354.
I1. Savchuk v. Rush, 311 Minn. 480, _ 245 N.W.2d 624, 629 (1976).
1980]
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the State of Minnesota but the plaintiff in the action is a resi-
dent of Minnesota.'
2
Further, the Minnesota Supreme Court found that quasi in rem
jurisdiction was constitutionally permissible because Rush was given
proper notice of the suit, his liability was limited to his insurance policy
coverage, and the application of the garnishment statute was limited to
a Minnesota resident.' 3 In addition, the court believed the minimum
contacts standard was satisfied for quasi in rem jurisdiction because
State Farm was doing business in Minnesota and because of Minne-
sota's interest in protecting its residents by providing them with a fo-
rum in which to litigate their claims.' 4
Rush appealed the decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court to
the United States Supreme Court which vacated the judgment and re-
manded the case for further consideration.'" On remand, the Minne-
sota Supreme Court considered the standards laid down by Shaffer v.
Heitner,t6 and held that the exercise of quasi in rem jurisdiction via
garnishment of a motor vehicle insurer's obligation to a nonresident
insured was consistent with the due process standards delineated in
Shaffer. 7 This decision was appealed to the United States Supreme
Court and reversed. 8
III. EVOLUTION OF THE DUE PROCESS LIMITATION ON STATE
COURT JURISDICTION
Bases for state court jurisdiction have been historically categorized
as in personam, quasi in rem, or in rem. 9 A court's assertion of juris-
diction based on its authority over the defendant's person is in per-
sonam; the court possesses the authority to impose a personal
obligation on the defendant in favor of the plaintiff.20 If, however, the
court's jurisdiction is based on property within its territory, this juris-
12. Id. at - 245 N.W.2d at 628.
13. Id. at __ 245 N.W.2d at 629.
14. Id.
15. Rush v. Savchuk, 433 U.S. 902 (1977). The Court stated that the decision on remand was
to be made according to the standards set forth in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
16. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
17. Savchuk v. Rush, 311 Minn. 480, __ 272 N.W.2d 888, 889 (1978).
18. 100 S.Ct. 571 (1980).
19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, Introductory Note at 102-03 (1969).
20. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 199 (1977); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 246 (1958);
RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS, Introductory Note at 5-6 (1942); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS, Introductory Note at 103 (1969).
[Vol. 15:827
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diction is characterized as either in rem or quasi in rem.2'
Judgment in an in rem case or a quasi in rem case is limited to the
property providing the basis of jurisdiction.2 2 There is seldom any
agreement on the distinction to be made between in rem and quasi in
rem.2 3 If liberally construed, however, an in rem judgment may be
viewed as one affecting the defendant's interest in the designated prop-
erty.24 A quasi in rem judgment would not seek to affect the defend-
ant's interest in the property, but would seek to enforce a personal
judgment against the defendant by applying the property to satisfy the
claim. 5
In order to determine whether the assertion of a forum's jurisdic-
tion is permissible, two inquiries must be made: a determination of
whether assertion of jurisdiction is authorized by the law of the forum,
and if so, whether such exercise of jurisdiction is permitted by the four-
teenth amendment's due process clause.2 6
A. The Development of In Personam Jurisdiction
In 1877, the United States Supreme Court, in Pennoyer v. Neff,2 7
found that "[t]he authority of every tribunal is necessarily restricted by
the territorial limits of the state in which it is established. '2 8 A state's
primary basis for in personam jurisdiction, therefore, was a defendant's
physical presence within that state.
The first abrogation of the territoriality principle came with the
expanding use of the automobile. States desiring to protect their citi-
zens from nonresident motorists enacted nonresident motorist stat-
utes.2 9 These statutes, through the use of a legal fiction, provided that
anyone who operated a motor vehicle within a state consented to that
21. 433 U.S. at 199; 357 U.S. at 246; RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS, Introductory Note at 6-7
(1942); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, Introductory Note at 103-04 (1969).
22. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 199 (1977).
23. Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 312 (1950).
24. 433 U.S. at 199 n.17; 357 U.S. at 246 n.12.
25. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, Introductory Note at 104 (1969). See
433 U.S. at 199 n.17; 357 U.S. at 246 n.12.
26. Broadway v. Webb, 473 F. Supp. 379, 380 (D.S.C. 1978); Gagner v. Parsons & Whitte-
more, Inc., 450 F. Supp. 1093, 1096 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Jackson v. Bishop College, 359 So. 2d 704,
705 (La. Ct. App. 1978); Good Hope Indus., Inc. v. Ryder Scott Co., - Mass. _ _ 389 N.E.2d
76, 79 (1979). Howells v. McKibben, - Minn. __ __ 281 N.W.2d 154, 155-56 (1979); Hawkins v.
Sommers, 39 N.C. App. 617, _ 251 S.E.2d 640, 643 (1979); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 585 P.2d 351, 352-53 (Okla. 1978).
27. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
28. Id. at 720.
29. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, § 391 (1971).
1980]
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state's jurisdiction.3" In 1927, the United States Supreme Court, in
Hess v. Pawloski,3' upheld the use of nonresident motorist statutes.
Hess opened the door for adoption of nonresident motorist statutes by
virtually every state.32
The next expansion of in personam jurisdiction over nonresident
defendants came in 1945, in International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
33
where the Supreme Court said:
Historically the jurisdiction of courts to render judgments in
personam is grounded on their de facto power over the de-
fendant's person . . . .But now ...due process requires
only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in
personam, if he be not present within the territory of the fo-
rum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice. 34
International Shoe established the minimum contacts test as the
contemporary constitutional standard for in personam jurisdiction over
nonresident defendants. What constituted minimum contacts was to be
determined by a defendant's "contacts, ties, or relations" with the fo-
rum state.35
In McGee v. InternationalLife Insurance CO.,36 the Supreme Court
apparently extended the minimum contacts concept to the constitution-
ally permissible limit. There, a California state court asserted in per-
sonam jurisdiction over a nonresident Texas corporation. The court
found the requisite minimum contacts owing to a single insurance con-
tract entered into between the plaintiff, a California resident, and the
Texas corporation. The Supreme Court noted that the trend of ex-
panding the permissible scope of state court jurisdiction over nonresi-
dent defendants was attributable to the transformation of our national
economy.
30. The fiction used by the various states was that the nonresident motorist by use of the
forum state's highways appointed the Secretary of State as his agent to accept process. Therefore,
because the motorist's agent could be personally served within the forum state, then the forum
state could assert in personam jurisdiction over the nonresident driver. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433
U.S. 186, 202 (1977).
31. 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
32. E.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 17453 (West 1971); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 95 , § 10-301 (Smith-
Hurd Cum. Supp. 1979); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 170.55 (West Cum. Supp. 1980); N.Y. VEIl. &
TRAF. LAW § 253 (McKinney 1970 & Cum. Supp. 1979-1980).
33. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
34. Id. at 316.
35. Id. at 319.
36. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
[Vol. 15:827
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Today many commercial transactions touch two or more
states and may involve parties separated by full continents.
With this increasing nationalization of commerce has come a
great increase in the amount of business conducted by mail
across state lines. At the same time modem transportation
and communication have made it much less burdensome for a
party sued to defend himself in a state where he engages in
economic activity. 7
Furthermore, the Court indicated that in considering whether the
maintenance of the suit offends "traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice," the interest of the forum state in providing "effec-
tive means of redress for its residents" is a factor to be considered in
38appropriate cases.
Perhaps fearing that the floodgates had been opened, the Court
issued a warning in Hanson v. Denckla.3 9 The Court pointed out that
the change of in personam requirements from the rigid Pennoyer terri-
torial principle to the minimum contacts standard of International Shoe
did not reflect a trend toward the eventual demise of all limitations on
the state court's assertion of in personam jurisdiction.4' "Those restric-
tions are more than a guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or dis-
tant litigation. They are a consequence of territorial limitations on the
power of the respective states."4
Making clear that the due process limitation on state courts exer-
cising jurisdiction was not an outdated concept, the Hanson Court su-
perimposed on the minimum contacts standard the notion that the
unilateral activity of the plaintiff did not satisfy the due process stan-
dard.4" The Court stated that "it is essential in each case that there be
some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privi-
lege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the
benefits and protections of its laws."43 The forum state cannot acquire
in personam jurisdiction "by being the 'center of gravity' of the contro-
versy, or the most convenient location for litigation. The issue is per-
sonal jurisdiction, not choice of law."'
37. Id. at 222-23.
38. Id. at 223.
39. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
40. Id. at251.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 253.
43. Id. (emphasis added).
44. Id. at 254.
1980]
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The state legislatures, in an effort to protect their citizens, enacted
long-arm statutes45 that attempted to identify what constituted mini-
mum contacts so as to make their assertion of in personam jurisdiction
consistent with the outer limits of due process. Many state long-arm
statutes authorize exercising in personam jurisdiction over a nonresi-
dent defendant as to a cause of action arising from an act or omission
occurring outside the forum and culminating within the forum.46 As-
sertion of in personam jurisdiction via these long-arm provisions has
been held to be consistent with the minimum contacts standard if the
nonresident defendant had reason to foresee that his activity outside
the forum state would cause effects within the forum state. 7
45. Long-arm statutes give state courts authority to assert in personam jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant so long as it is consistent with the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. See Fields v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 555 P.2d 48, 52 (1978).
46. The long-arm statutes that authorize such exercise ofjurisdiction vary from state to state.
See, e.g, S.D. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 15-7-2(2) (1968), which authorizes in personam jurisdiction
over any person who causes tortious injury within the state by a tortious act done outside the state.
UNIFORM INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURE ACT § 1.03(a)(4), requires, in addition
to causing the tortious injury within the forum state by a tortious act done outside the state, that
the defendant "regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of
conduct; or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered, in this
state.". ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch. 110, § 17 (Smith-Hurd 1968), authorizes in personam jurisdiction if
there is a "commission of a tortious act within this state." This provision, however, has been
construed to allow Illinois courts to assert in personam jurisdiction if a tortious act is done outside
the state but causes injury within Illinois. Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.,
22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761, 763 (1961).
See also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-145(a)(3) (1975), which subjects nonresident corporations to
suit in North Carolina as to any cause of action arising
out of the production, manufacture, or distribution of goods by such corporation with
the reasonable expectation that those goods are to be used or consumed in this State and
are so used or consumed, regardless of how or where the goods were produced, manufac-
tured, marketed, or sold or whether or not through the medium of independent contrac-
tors or dealers.
47. Ajax Realty Corp. v. J. F. Zook, Inc., 493 F.2d 818, 822 (4th Cir. 1972); Alliance Cloth-
ing, Ltd. v. Denver, 187 Colo. 400, _ 532 P.2d 351, 353-54 (1975); Boykin v. Lindenkranar, 252
So. 2d 467, 470 (La. Ct. App. 1971); Harper v. Rolf Brauchl, Inc., 71 Mich. App. 263, _, 247
N.W. 2d 375, 378 (1976); Gonzales v. Harris Calorific Co., 64 Misc. 2d 287, _ 315 N.Y.S.2d 51,
55 (Sup. Ct., 1970); Winston Indus., Inc. v. District Court, 560 P.2d 572, 574 (Okla. 1977); Fields v.
Volkswagen of Am., Inc. 555 P.2d 48, 53 (Okla. 1976); McCrory Corp. v. Girard Rubber Corp.,
225 Pa. Super. Ct. 45, _, 307 A.2d 435, 437-38 (1973); Omstead v. Braden Heaters, Inc., 5 Wash.
App. 258, _., 487 P.2d 234, 242 (1971); Fields v. Peyer, 75 Wis. 2d 644, _ 250 N.W.2d 311, 316
(1977).
For later cases see notes 126-31 infra and accompanying text. See also RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 37, Reporter's Note at 161-62 (1971). But see Granite States Volk-
swagen, Inc. v. Denver, 177 Colo. 42, _ 492 P.2d 624, 625 (1972). Tilley v. Keller Truck &
Implement Corp., 200 Kan. 641, , 438 P.2d 128, 134 (1968); Pellegrini v. Sachs & Sons, 522 P.2d
704, 707 (Utah 1974). Oliver v. American Motors Corp., 70 Wash. 2d 875, _ 425 P.2d 647, 655-
56 (1967). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 37 (1971), which
states,
A state has power to exercise judicial jurisdiction over an individual who causes effects
in the state by an act done elsewhere with respect to any cause of action arising from
8
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The concept of foreseeability as providing a basis for in personam
jurisdiction has most frequently arisen in products liability cases. If the
manufacturer of an alleged defective product could reasonably foresee
that its product would be purchased or used in the forum state, and
such product is purchased or used in the forum state, then the nonresi-
dent manufacturer may be subject to the in personam jurisdiction of
the forum state.48 Such an assertion of jurisdiction has been upheld
even when the record failed to disclose whether the nonresident manu-
these effects unless the nature of the effects and of the individual's relationship to the
state make the exercise of such jurisdiction unreasonable.
For a collection of cases see Annot., 19 A.L.R.3d 13, 119 (1968).
48. In the often cited case of Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill.
2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961), the defendant manufactured a safety valve in Ohio and later sold
the valve to American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corporation. It was then attached to a
water heater in Pennsylvania and sold to a customer in Illinois. This customer was injured by the
explosion of the water heater which was allegedly caused by the negligent construction of the
safety valve by the Ohio manufacturer.
Although the Illinois statute provided that the tortious act must have been committed in
Illinois, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 17(l)(b) (Smith-Hurd 1968), the court interpreted it as author-
izing jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant when his tortious act outside Illinois caused injury
in Illinois. 22 Ill. 2d at _ 176 N.E.2d at 763. Feeling that it was reasonable to infer that the
manufacturer's commercial transactions resulted in substantial use and consumption of the prod-
uct in Illinois, the court found the assertion of jurisdiction to be consistent with the minimum
contacts test. Id. at _ 176 N.E.2d at 766.
The holding in Gray was interpreted by the Arizona Supreme Court in the case of Phillips v.
Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 100 Ariz. 251, 413 P.2d 732 (1966), to mean "that a nonresident
defendant is amenable to personal jurisdiction where his defective product causes injury within
the forum though he did not intentionally put his product there, unless he, the defendant, proves
that the presence of his product in the forum was an unforeseeable event." Id. at _ 413 P.2d at
736.
In Metal-Matic, Inc. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 82 Nev. 263, 415 P.2d 617 (1966), the
action resulted from a drowning alledgedly caused by a defective boat railing which was manufac-
tured and assembled in Minnesota by the Metal-Matic Corporation. The court, pursuant to Ne-
vada's long-arm statute, NEv. Rav. STAT. § 14.080 (1973), held Metal-Matic subject to Nevada's
jurisdiction. The court's basis for asserting in personam jurisdiction was that where it is reason-
ably foreseeable that a manufacturer's product will enter the stream of commerce, then the manu-
facturer can be sued in any state where its product has allegedly caused an injury. This will be
true notwithstanding "how many hands have touched the product from its production to the time
or place of the injury. Whether it be labeled a minimal contact ... or a one act tort, the effect is
the same, Le., jurisdiction in the forum state attaches." 82 Nev. at _ 415 P.2d at 619.
In Winston Indus., Inc. v. District Court, 560 P.2d 572 (Okla. 1977), the Oklahoma Supreme
Court adopted the concept of foreseeability as the standard for determining in personamjurisdic-
tion over a nonresident defendant. An action was brought in Oklahoma against a manufacturer
for damages resulting from an allegedly defective mobile home. The manufacturer's principle
place of business was in Alabama. It was noted that the manufacturer had no business, employ-
ees, or manufacturing facilities in Oklahoma. The mobile home was originally purchased out of
state and subsequently purchased secondhand in Oklahoma by the plaintiff. The court first deter-
mined that the foreign manufacturer did not have the requisite "minimum contacts" required for
the assertion of in personam jurisdiction. Id. at 573. It further found, however, that in personam
jurisdiction could be properly exercised over the foreign manufacturer on the basis that it was
reasonably foreseeable that its product would enter the stream of interstate commerce, and ulti-
mately be used in Oklahoma. Id. at 574.
9
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facturer had any other contacts with the forum other than the isolated
occurrence that provided jurisdiction. 9 Courts have found it irrelevant
"how many hands have touched the product from its production to the
time or place of the injury. The result will be the same even if the
product was purchased from an independent middleman or someone
other than the nonresident manufacturer who shipped the product into
the forum state."50
The foreseeability concept as the basis for in personam jurisdiction
has also been expanded to everyone in the chain of distribution. That
is, if the importer, distributor, or retailer could reasonably foresee at
the time of introducing the product into the stream of interstate com-
merce that it would be purchased or used in the forum state by a con-
sumer, then that state could assert in personam jurisdiction over him.5'
B. The Development of Quasi In Rem Jurisdiction
The Pennoyer principles of territoriality were the constitutional
standard not only for in personam jurisdiction, but also for quasi in
rem and in rem jurisdiction.5 2 These principles made it extremely diffi-
cult to obtain jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant within the fo-
rum where the plaintiff resides. Since, however, the state where
property was located was considered to have exclusive jurisdiction over
that property, a resident plaintiff could obtain jurisdiction over the
nonresident defendant by attaching the nonresident's property located
in the forum state.53
Intangible property, as well as tangible property, has been found
to be sufficient to support jurisdiction. This idea was first recognized
by the United States Supreme Court in Harris v. Balk, 45 which repre-
sented the high water mark of state court assertion of quasi in rem ju-
risdiction. By using intangible property, a debt, as a basis for asserting
49. Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ii. 2d 432, _, 176 N.E.2d
761, 766 (1961).
50. Id. at - 176 N.E.2d at 766; 82 Nev. at - 415 P.2d at 619.
51. Fields v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 555 P.2d 48 (Okla. 1976).
52. The principles delineated by the Court in Pennoyer were that every state possessed exclu-
sive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory and no state pos-
sessed authority to exercise direct jurisdiction over persons or property outside its territory.
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877).
53. See Shafer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 200 (1977).
54. 198 U.S. 215 (1905). Harris involved a Maryland resident, Epstein, who had a claim
against Balk, a North Carolina resident. Harris, also a North Carolina resident, owed money to
Balk. While Harris was temporarily in Maryland, Epstein garnished Harris' debt to Balk to sat-
isfy his claim against Balk. The United States Supreme Court held that the situs of the debt
"clings and accompanies" the debtor wherever he goes. Id. at 222.
[Vol. 15:827
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jurisdiction, courts were able to establish a legal mechanism that pro-
vided residents, who were unable to obtain in personam jurisdiction
over a nonresident defendant, with a procedure for obtaining quasi in
rem jurisdiction over that nonresident defendant.-
This mechanism was first established in the case of Seider v.
Roth.56 In Seider, the court based its jurisdiction on a contractual obli-
gation owed to the nonresident by his insurer.57 The insurer was li-
censed to do business in the forum state. Therefore, finding that the
insurer was present in the forum and that the obligation followed the
obligor, the court was able to assert quasi in rem jurisdiction."
The rationale of Seider withstood a constitutional challenge in the
case of Stimpson v. Loehmann.5 9 The Stimpson court, relying explicitly
on Harris v. Balk, found no denial of due process by adhering to the
Seider holding. It predicated its decision on a "realistic and reasonable
evaluation of the respective rights of plaintiffs, defendants and the State
in terms of fairness."6 The court stated:
Viewed realistically, the insurer in a case such as the present
is in full control of the litigation; it selects the defendant's at-
55. Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 112, 216 N.E.2d 312, 313, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99, 100 (1966).
See generally Annot., 33 A.L.R.3d 992, 996 (1970).
56. 17 N.Y.2d I1l, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
57. The plaintiffs, New York residents, unable to obtain in personam jurisdiction over the
nonresident defendant, instituted a quasi in rem proceeding by attaching the nonresident's auto-
mobile insurance policy. The New York Court of Appeals concluded that the jurisdiction was
properly acquired via the attachment procedure. The court reasoned that as soon as the accident
occurred there was imposed on the insurer a contractual obligation which would be considered a
debt owing to the insured. Id. at 113, 216 N.E.2d at 314, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 101.
58. Id. at 114, 216 N.E.2d at 315, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 102. Judge Burke's dissent in Seider
stated:
[T]he plaintiffs indulge in circular ratiocination. The jurisdiction, they assert, is based
upon a promise which evidently does not mature until there is jurisdiction. The exist-
ence of the policy is used as a sufficient basis for jurisdiction to start the very action
necessary to activate the insurer's obligation under the policy. In other words, the prom-
ise to defend the insured is assumed to furnish the jurisdiction for a civil suit which must
be validly commenced before the obligation to defend can possibly accrue.
Id. at 115, 216 N.E.2d at 315, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 103.
See also Reese, The Expanding Scope of Jurisdiction over Non-Residents-New York Goes
Wild, 35 INS. COUNSEL J. 118 (1968); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 5201 (McKinney 1978) (Seigel,
Supplementary Practice Commentary); Comment, Garnishment of Intangibles: Contingent Obliga-
tions and Interstate Corporation, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 550 (1967).
59. 21 N.Y.2d 305, 234 N.E.2d 669, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1967). The fact situation was similar
to that in Seider in that the plaintiff was unable to obtain in personam jurisdiction over the non-
resident defendant and, therefore, resorted to quasi in rem jurisdiction in accordance with the
Seider doctrine. Id. at 308, 234 N.E.2d at 670, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 634. See note, The Constitutional-
ity of Seider v. Roth After Shaffer v. Heitner, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 409, 409 n.4 (1978). "In per-
sonam jurisdiction would, of course, be preferable to Seiderjurisdiction, since a judgment based
on full in personam jurisdiction would not be limited by the amount of the policy." Id.
60. 21 N.Y.2d at 311, 234 N.E.2d at 672, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 637.
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torneys; it decides if and when to settle; and it makes all pro-
cedural decisions in connection with the litigation. Moreover,
where the plaintiff is a resident of the forum state and the
insurer is present in and regulated by it, the State has a sub-
stantial and continuing relation with the controversy.6"
Fearful of the possible repercussions presented by Seider,61 Judge
Friendly, writing for the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, in Minichiello v. Rosenberg,63 resorted to a different rationale
that allowed for the same favorable result for the plaintiffs. Judge
Friendly construed Seider to be the equivalent of a "judicially created
direct action statute.' The insurer doing business in New York is con-
sidered the real party in interest and the nonresident insured is viewed
simply as a conduit, who has to be named as a defendant in order to
provide a conceptual basis for getting at the insurer. ' 65
On rehearing en banc, the Minichiello court focused on whether
the obligation of a nonresident insured to defend a tort action in New
York, simply because his insurance company does business in New
York, was unconstitutionally burdensome. 66 In finding that it was not,
the court reasoned that the judicially created direct action statute pro-
tected the nonresident insured far more than that required by Harris v.
Balk.6 7 It felt that the nonresident defendant had only a slight interest
in the litigation and was only a nominal defendant.68
61. Id. (citations omitted).
62. In Stimpson the court reaffirmed its earlier holding in Seider. Of the six judges, Judges
Burke and Scileppi dissented and from this Judges Breitel and Bergan concurred solely on the
basis of stare decisis. Judge Breitel's opinion, with which Judge Bergan concurred, stated:
I concur but only on contraint of Seider v. Roth so recently decided by this court. Only a
major reappraisal by the court, rather than the accident of a change in its composition,
would justify the overruling of that precedent. Yet the theoretical unsoundness of the
Seider case and the undesirable practical consequences of its rule require some comment
if only, perhaps, to hasten the day of its overruling or its annulment by legislation.
Id. at 314, 234 N.E.2d at 674, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 640. The decision in Seider received extremely
"poor press from the commentators." Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106, 108 (2d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844 (1969).
63. 410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844 (1969).
64. A direct action statute allows "injured parties to bring direct actions against liability in-
surance companies that have issued policies contracting to pay liabilities imposed on persons who
inflict injury." Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66, 67 (1954) (direct action
statute held constitutional). See generaly S. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE
§§ 4861-66 (1962).
65. 410 F.2d at 109. Judge Friendly limited the use of the judicially created direct action
statute to New York residents who had been injured in an out of state accident. Id. at 110.
66. Id. at 118.
67. Id. See generaly Rosenberg, One Procedure Genie Too Many or Putting Seider Back into
its Bottle, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 660, 665-67 (1971).
68. The reasoning of the court was that in Harris v. Balk
Balk had to decide whether to hire a Maryland lawyer to protect his interest in the $180
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In summary, Harris v. Balk established the foundation for a series
of cases, initiated by Seider v. Roth, which provided forum residents
with a device for obtaining quasi in rem jurisdiction when asserting in
personam jurisdiction was not possible. Jurisdiction was obtained by
attaching the defendant insurer's contractual obligation to defend and
indemnify the insured.
Two distinct points were focused upon to rationalize asserting ju-
risdiction: first, the presence of the nonresident defendant's property in
the forum, resulting in a true quasi in rem proceeding; second, the pres-
ence of the nonresident defendant's insurer within the forum, resulting
in a judicially created direct action statute.
C. Shaffer v. Heitner." A Uniform Constitutional Standardfor411
Types of Jurisdiction.
Shaffer v. Heitner69 , decided in 1977, broke nearly two decades of
silence by the Court concerning the due process limitation on jurisdic-
tion. The issue before the Court was whether a state court could assert
quasi in rem jurisdiction solely on the basis of the presence of stock
within the forum, absent other ties among the defendants, the forum,
and the litigation, without violating the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment.7" Before addressing this issue, the Court examined
the historical development of the various types of jurisdiction.71 The
Court noted that the development of the constitutional standard for in
personam jurisdiction, from the Pennoyer territoriality principle to the
International Shoe minimum contacts principle, had not been dupli-
cated in the area of quasi in rem and in rem jurisdiction.7 2 Thus, the
Court believed that traditional notions of fair play and substantial jus-
tice were being offended by the perpetuation of the territorial principle
as the constitutional standard for asserting quasi in rem or in rem juris-
diction.73 In light of this, the Court felt that the validity of a court's
debt Harris owed him. [Further], [t]he Maryland judgment deprived Balk of money he
could have used for whatever purpose he willed. [In contrast, the insured defendants],
are entitled to have lawyers in New York furnished by their insurers without expense
[and] a Seider judgment would mean simply that liability policies, on which [insured]
appellants could not have realized for any purpose other than to protect themselves
against losses to others, will be applied to the very objective for which they were pro-
cured.
410 F.2d at 118.
69. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
70. Id. at 189.
71. Id. at 196-206.
72. Id. at 205.
73. Id. at 212.
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assertion of jurisdiction, regardless of the basis for that assertion,
should be determined by the minimum contacts test as elucidated in
International Shoe and its progeny.7 4
The Court noted that uniformly applying the minimum contacts
test would not, in all likelihood, affect in rem jurisdiction, where the
property itself is the object of the controversy,75 or quasi in rem juris-
diction, where the property is related to the plaintiffs cause of action. 6
The Court found, however, that when the property is neither the sub-
ject matter of the litigation, nor related to the plaintiffs cause of action,
its only purpose being to provide a basis for asserting jurisdiction, then
jurisdiction would be denied under the minimum contacts test. 77
[Allthough the presence of the defendant's property in a State
might suggest the existence of other ties among the defendant,
the State, and the litigation, the presence of the property alone
would not support the State's jurisdiction. If those other ties
did not exist, cases over which the State is now thought to
have jurisdiction could not be brought in that forum.78
The effect of Shaffer is to provide a uniform standard for all asser-
tions of state court jurisdiction.7 9 The uniform test will be the mini-
mum contacts test as outlined by International Shoe and its progeny.
When "the only role played by the property is to provide the basis for
bringing the defendant into court,"80 then the nonresident property
owner must have sufficient contacts with the forum state to meet the
minimum contacts standard.
In addition to expanding the minimum contacts standard, the
Shaffer opinion indicated what would be required in order to satisfy
that standard. The Court focused its attention on the relationship
"among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation"8 ' to determine
74. Id. at 206.
75. Id. at 207-08; Smit, The Enduring Utility of In Rem Rules. A Lasting Legacy ofPennoyer
v. Neff, 43 BROOKLYN L. REv. 600, 616-22 (1977). See notes 21-24 supra and accompanying text.
433 U.S. at 208.
76. See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
77. 433 U.S. at 208-09.
78. Id. at 209.
79. "We therefore conclude that all assertions of state court jurisdiction must be evaluated
according to the standards set forth in International Shoe and its progeny." Id. at 212; See gener.
ally Recent Case, Constitutional Law-Courts-All State Court Jurisdiction Governed by 'Minimum
Contacts," 54 N.D.L. REv. 260 (1977); Notes, Civil Procedure-A Single Theory of State Court
Jurisdiction: "Minimum Contacts," 52 TUL. L. REV. 171 (1977); Note, Shaffer v. Heitner: The
Supreme Court Establishes a Uniform Approach to State Court Jurisdiction, 35 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 131 (1978).
80. 433 U.S. at 209.
81. Id. at 204.
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whether the exercise of state court jurisdiction was consistent with due
process. This inquiry may be contrasted with the test espoused in Inter-
national Shoe which spoke only of the defendants "contacts, ties or re-
lations" with the forum state. 2
The Court in Shaffer also resurrected the Hanson requirement that
a defendant must purposefully avail himself of the benefits and protec-
tion of the forum state.13 In doing so, Justice Marshall, author of the
majority opinion, identified the rationale behind the Hanson test. A
defendant who purposely avails himself of the benefits and protections
of the forum state, should anticipate being required to appear before
that distant forum. 4 Justice Stevens, in his concurring opinion in Shaf-
fer, was in accord with Justice Marshall's reasoning in requiring the
nonresident to have "fair warning" that his activities with the foreign
state may subject his person to the foreign state's jurisdiction.85
In the following year, the United States Supreme Court, in the
case of Kulko v. Superior Court,86 again emphasized that the nonresi-
dent defendant must have purposefully availed himself of the privileges
of the forum state so that he could reasonably have anticipated the
State's jurisdiction. 7 The Kulko Court found an essential inquiry in
determining whether the maintenance of a suit offends traditional no-
tions of fair play and substantial justice to be "whether the 'quality and
nature' of the defendant's activity is such that it is 'reasonable' and
'fair' to require him to conduct his defense in that State."88
D. Post Shaffer
1. Foreseeability as a Basis for In Personam Jurisdiction
The effect of Shaffer and Kulko on in personam jurisdiction was to
clarify the minimum contacts standard of International Shoe.89 To sat-
isfy this standard, the Court emphasized the need for the forum state to
82. 326 U.S. at 319.
83. 433 U.S. at 215-16.
84. See id. at 216.
85. The requirement of fair notice also, I believe, includes fair warning that a particular
activity may subject a person to the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign. If I visit another
state, or acquire real estate or open a bank account in it, I knowingly assume some risk
that the state will exercise its power over my property or my person while there. My
contact with the state, though minimal, gives rise to predictable risks.
Id. at 218 (Stevens, J., concurring).
86. 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
87. Id. at 97-98.
88. Id. at 92.
89. See note 106 supra and accompanying text.
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establish a sufficient relationship among the defendant, the forum, and
the litigation.90 Due process does not contemplate that a state court
may assert jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant when that defend-
ant has no contacts, ties, or relations with the forum state.9'
Despite the emphasis on minimum contacts, some state courts con-
tinued to assert in personam jurisdiction over nonresident defendants
on the basis that the defendant could have reasonably foreseen that his
tortious activity outside the state might produce injury within the fo-
rum state.9" This idea of foreseeability has been interpreted by courts
as being the equivalent of, or the alternative to, the minimum contacts
standard.93
Cases applying the foreseeability concept have been primarily lim-
ited to lawsuits arising from a defective product which is highly mobile,
such as an airplane or an automobile.94 These cases stand for the prop-
osition that sellers of a transient product must defend a lawsuit in any
state where the product has caused an injury. The reasoning is that,
owing to the product's mobility, it was reasonably foreseeable that the
product might be purchased or used in the particular state where the
injury occurred.
2. The Constitutionality of Seider Jurisdiction After Shaffer
After Shaffer had delineated a uniform test for all state court as-
sertions of jurisdiction, it seemed evident to those who opposed the rea-
soning of Seider, either as a quasi in rem proceeding or as a direct
90. 433 U.S. at 204.
91. Id. (citing International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)).
92. Executive Jet Sales, Inc. v. Jet Am., Inc., 148 Ga. App. 475, 252 S.E.2d 54 (1978); Bra-
band v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 51111. App. 3d 196, 367 N.E.2d 118 (1977); Sybron Corp. v. Wetzel,
46 N.Y.2d 197, 385 N.E.2d 1055, 413 N.Y.S.2d 127 (1978); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 585 P.2d 351 (Okla. 1978).
93. See, e.g., Sybron Corp. v. Wetzel, 46 N.Y.2d 197, 206, 385 N.E.2d 1055, 1059, 413
N.Y.S.2d 127, 132 (1978); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 585 P.2d 351, 353 (Okla.
1978) (statute which authorized jurisdiction has been interpreted as conferring jurisdiction to the
outer limits permitted by due process).
94. In Braband v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 51 111. App. 3d 296, 367 N.E.2d 118 (1977), the
Illinois Appellate Court said, "It is not offensive to 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice' to say to the manufacturer of a transient product such as an airplane that it must defend
the lawsuit in a reasonably foreseeable place." Id. at _ 367 N.E.2d at 123. In Executive Jet
Sales, Inc. v. Jet Am., Inc., 148 Ga. App. 475, 252 S.E.2d 54 (1978), the Georgia Court of Appeals
held that an Ohio-based "repair station," engaged in the maintenance, inspection, and repair ofjet
aircraft, was subject to its jurisdiction owing to "the character and extent of the services [Executive
Jet Sales] performed, the nature of the aircraft which it maintained and the qualities and locations
of its customers .... " Id. at _ 252 S.E.2d at 55. Because of these factors the court found that
"it was reasonably foreseeable that [Executive Jet Sales'] negligence would have tortious conse-
quences in Georgia." Id.
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action proceeding, that it would no longer withstand a constitutional
challenge. Courts which considered Seider jurisdiction subsequent to
Shaffer have split, however, over its implications. Several courts have
held that such jurisdiction is precluded by Shaffer, while others have
found that such jurisdiction is in accord with due process.
This split is a result of the two different theories advanced in sup-
port of Seider. Courts viewing Seider jurisdiction as a quasi in rem
proceeding have found such a jurisdictional assertion to be unconstitu-
tional in light of Shaffer.9 6 The relationship between the defendant
and the forum is not sufficient, the only ties being that the defendant's
insurer does business within the forum state. This is not sufficient to
satisfy the minimum contacts test of International Shoe.
Those courts which viewed Seider jurisdiction as a judicially cre-
ated direct action statute have found it to comport with the require-
ments of due process.97 Courts taking this view have felt that since the
full force of the judgment rests on the insurer,98 then the minimum
contacts standard should be applied to it and not the insured. 99
Seider v. Roth [is] sui generis in the field of jurisdiction. [It]
cannot be pigeon-holed as in rem or in personam. .... [I]n
95. N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAW § 5201 (McKinney 1978) (Seigel Supplementary Practice Com-
mentary); see Reese, Shaffer v. Heitner: Implicationsfor the Doctrine ofSeider v. Roth, 63 IowA
L. REV. 1023 (1978); Note, Shaffer v. Heitner. The Death ofSeider v. Roth?, 29 SYRACUSE L. REV.
961 (1978); Note, Shaffer v. Heitner and The Seider Doctrine, 39 U. Prrr. L. REy. 747 (1978). Cf.
Comment, Shaffer v. Heitner's Effect on Pre-Judgment Attachment, Jurisdiction Based on Propery,
and New York's Seider Doctrine. Have We Finally Given up the Ghost of the Res? 27 BUFFALO L.
REV. 323 (1978) (would hold Seiderjurisdiction as a quasi in rem proceeding unconstitutional, but
would uphold the constitutionality of Seider jurisdiction as a direct action suit); Comment The
Constitutionality of the Seider Practice after Shaffer v. Heitner, 49 U. COLO. L. REV. 321 (1978)
(would hold Seider as a quasi in rem proceeding unconstitutional and uphold Seider as a direct
action suit). But see Note, The Constitutionality of Seider v. Roth after Shaffer v. Heitner, 78
COLUM. L. REV. 409 (1978) (would uphold Seider jurisdiction either as quasi in rem or as a direct
action suit on the basis that the legal interests of the nonresident insured are not significantly
affected).
96. Attanasio v. Ferre, 93 Misc. 2d 661, 401 N.Y.S.2d 685 (Sup. Ct., 1977); Wallace v. Target
Stores, Inc., 92 Misc. 2d 454, _ 400 N.Y.S.2d 478, 481-82 (Sup. Ct., 1977); Katz v. Umansky, 92
Misc. 2d 285, _ 399 N.Y.S.2d 412, 416 (Sup. Ct. 1977). See O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp.,
579 F.2d 194, 196 n.2 (2d. Cir. 1978), for a list of those cases that have either upheld Seider
jurisdiction or held Seider jurisdiction unconstitutional.
97. O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 579 F.2d 194 (2d. Cir. 1978); Savchuk v. Rush, 311
Minn. 480, 272 N.W.2d 888 (1978); Baden v. Staples, 45 N.Y.2d 889, 383 N.E.2d 110, 410
N.Y.S.2d 808 (1978); Afford v. McGaw, 61 App. Div. 2d 504, 402 N.Y.S.2d 499 (1978).
98. Judge Friendly, writing for the majority in O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 579 F.2d
at 200, thought that "[t]he overriding teaching of Shaffer is that courts must look at realities and
not be led astray by fictions." Id. For this reason he found that, in reality, the insurer controls the
litigation and is the real party in interest in the action. See also Savchuk v. Rush, 311 Minn. 480,
.. 272 N.W.2d 888, 892 (1978).
99. See O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 579 F.2d 194, 200-01 (2d Cir. 1978).
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real terms [it is] in personam so far as the insurer is con-
cerned. For the named defendant, the suit is only an occasion
of cooperation in the defense; his active role is that of witness.
It is beside the point to test the constitutionality of the proce-
dure in terms of the named defendant. .. What is at stake in
the suit is the plaintiff's claim for the payment of his alleged
damages by the insurer. 0
Since the insurer is doing business within the forum state, the mini-
mum contacts standard would be met.
Courts which have upheld Seider jurisdiction have found it neces-
sary to distinguish Harris v. Balk, it being expressly overruled in Shaf-
fer.l0 t The distinction relied upon is that in Harris the property had no
relationship with the litigation, whereas in cases using Seider jurisdic-
tion the property had no independent significance or value apart from
the litigation. 02 The activity giving rise to the litigation created the
property which provided the basis for the court's jurisdiction.
IV. MINIMUM CONTACTS STANDARD: THREE TESTS
Having examined the development of the due process limitations
on state court jurisdiction, it is evident that the standards articulated in
International Shoe are not definable with any great precision. In ex-
amining International Shoe and its progeny, three tests emerge which
100. Id. at 200 (citing Judge Cooling's statement in O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 437 F.
Supp. 994, 1002 (E.D.N.Y. 1977)).
101. See note 97 supra and accompanying text.
102. Savchuk v. Rush, 311 Minn. 480, _ 272 N.W.2d 888, 892, & n.6 (1978). "[Tlhe insur-
ance policy was purchased to protect against the type of liability which is the subject of the lawsuit
and is therefore related to plaintiffs cause of action." Id. at _ 272 N.W.2d at 892 n.6. The
reasoning of the court was based on O'Conner v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 579 F.2d 194 (2d Cir.
1978). In O'Connor the court, in light of the holding in Shaffer, differentiated Seider-type cases
from Harrir-type cases on the basis that Seider does not sanction the type of quasi in rem action
typified by Harris v. Balk, that is, where the property which serves as the basis for asserting
jurisdiction is completely unrelated to the plaintiffs cause action. Id. at 199.
[A] [Seider] judgment for the plaintiff will not deprive a defendant of anything substan-
tial that would have been otherwise useful to him. He could not recover, sell or hypothe-
cate the covenant to indemnify; its utility is solely to protect him from liability and in
appropriate cases to allow the plaintiff to recover from the insurer.... What we said in
Minichiello, supra, nine years ago apropos of Harris v. Balk remains just as true today.
Id. See Note, Civil Procedure. In Rem Jurisdiction-Attachment of Insurance Debts-State Stat-
utes, O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 579 F2d 194 (2d Cir. 1978), 12 AKRON L. REv. 331, 336-
37 (1978); Note, The Constitutionality of Seider v. Roth After Shaffer v. Heitner, 78 COLUM. L.
REV. 409, 425 (1978); Note, Seider I1-Just when You Thought it Was Safe to Get in an Out-of-
State Accident with a New York Resident: .4 Comment on O'Conner v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 4
DEL. J. Corp. L. 479, 488-89 (1979); Note, Civil Procedure-Jurisdiction--onstitutionalit of At-
tachment of Liabilidy Insurance Policies to Obtain Quasi In Rem Jurisdiction After Shaffer v. Heit-
ner, 27 KAN. L. REV. 491, 494 (1979).
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are used to determine if a state court's assertion of jurisdiction is consis-
tent with the minimum contacts standard. These three tests may be
labeled the nexus test, the fair warning test, and the convenience test. 103
If any of these tests is not satisfied, then a state may not assert jurisdic-
tion over a nonresident defendant.
To satisfy the nexus test a state court must establish a sufficient
relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation."° In
addition, it is necessary that in every case the defendant's activity in the
forum state be such that the "maintenance of the suit does not offend
'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' "05
The fair warning test is satisfied when a nonresident defendant
purposely avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities within
the forum state." 6 By purposefully availing himself of the forum
state's benefits, the defendant should reasonably anticipate being haled
before that state's courts.10 7 This reasonable anticipation provides the
nonresident with fair warning that a lawsuit is possible. 08 Finally, a
state may consider a number of factors in determining whether it is a
convenient forum, 109 including its own interest in providing an effective
means of redress for its own residents." 0
By employing the minimum contacts standard's three tests as a
tool for analyzing the Court's recent opinions in World-Wide and
Rush, the current status of state court jurisdiction may be determined.
A. The Impact of World-Wide Volkswagen
After World- Wide, the constitutional standard to be applied to as-
sertions of state court jurisdiction is still the concept of minimum con-
103. See Woods, Pennoyer's Demise: Personal Jurisdiction After Shaffer and Kulko And A
Modest Prediction Regarding World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 20 ARIZ. L. REv. 861,
862, 905 (1978).
104. See note 81 supra and accompanying text.
105. 326 U.S. at 316. See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
106. See note 42 supra and accompanying text.
107. See note 117 supra and accompanying text.
108. See note 85 supra and accompanying text.
109. Professor Woods has identified several "fairness factors" that have been considered by
state courts. These include the relative aggressiveness of the parties, the relative economic burden
of prosecuting or defending the action, the importance of the governmental interest to be vindi-
cated, the convenience of the forum relative to the litigational efficiency, the necessity of litigation
in the chosen forum, the availability of alternative forums, and the impact of the forum's choice of
law rule. Woods, Pennoyer's Demise: Personal Jurisdiction After Shaffer AndKulko AndA Modest
Prediction Regarding World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 20 ARiz. L. REv. 861, 891
(1978).
110. See note 37 supra and accompanying text.
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tacts.I' The Court in World- Wide relied on the three tests advanced
earlier in this comment in order to determine if the requisite minimum
contacts were present. The Court found that the requirements of a suf-
ficient nexus and fair warning were needed "to ensure that the states,
through their courts, do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on
them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system." 2 The
convenience test "protects the defendant against the burdens of litigat-
ing in a distant or inconvenient forum." ' 3
In determining whether there was a sufficient nexus between
World-Wide and the, Oklahoma forum, the Court rejected the
Oklahoma Supreme Court's reasoning that, because an automobile is
mobile by its very design and purpose, it was foreseeable that the
Robinson's automobile would cause injury in Oklahoma.1 4 The Court
found that foreseeability alone was never sufficient to establish in per-
sonam jurisdiction.' The Court reasoned that if foreseeability pro-
vided a sufficient nexus, then "[e]very seller of chattels would in effect
appoint the chattel his agent for service of process. His amenability to
suit would travel with the chattel."' 6 Allowing such a result would be
to condone the principle found in Harris v. Balk and expressly rejected
in Shaffer.11 7
The Oklahoma Supreme Court also relied on the substantial reve-
111. 100 S.Ct. 559, 564 (19s0).
112. Id.
113. Id. "The Due Process Clause, by ensuring the 'orderly administration of the laws,' gives a
degree of predictability to the legal system that allows potential defendants to structure their pri-
mary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render
them liable to suit." Id. at 567 (citations omitted).
114. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson 585 P.2d 351, 354 (Okla. 1978).
115. 100 S.Ct. at 566. The Court drew an analogy between the foreseeability of use concept for
in personam jurisdiction and that of a creditor's amenability to a quasi in rem action which travels
with his debtor. The Court was unwilling to endorse the foreseeability of use concept since it was
analogous to the principle held unconstitutional in Shaffer. Id. at 566-67. See Erlanger Mills, Inc.
v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 F.2d 502, (4th Cir. 1956), where Judge Sobeloff illustrated the
foreseeability of use concept's burdens on interstate commerce.
[L]et us consider the hesitancy a California dealer might feel if asked to sell a set of tires
to a tourist with Pennsylvania license plates, knowing that he might be required to de-
fend in the courts of Pennsylvania a suit for refund of the purchase price or for heavy
damages in case of accident attributed to a defect in the tires. As in the hypothetical
case, the sale in the principal case was "with the reasonable expectation that these goods
are to be used or consumed in [the vendee's domicile] and are so used and consumed." It
is difficult to conceive of a more serious threat and deterrent to the free flow of commerce
between the states.
Id. at 507.
116. 100 S.Ct. at 566.
117. Id. at 566-67.
[Vol. 15:827
20
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 15 [1979], Iss. 4, Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol15/iss4/7
STATE ADJUDICATORY JURISDICTION
nues that it felt World-Wide derived from the forum.'" 8 This conclu-
sion was inferred from three factors: the revenue earned on the sale of
the car to the plaintiff; a realization that the purpose of the automobile
was to travel; and, the fact that Oklahoma provides highways to allow
this travel.' ' The Oklahoma court felt that the revenue generated by
the forum was sufficient to provide the contacts necessary to assert in
personam jurisdiction. 2 °
Although skeptical of the inference drawn by the Oklahoma court,
the Supreme Court nonetheless accepted it; but still found that it was
not sufficient to provide the necessary nexus between the defendant and
the forum. 2' The Court found that simply deriving revenues from an
activity which in itself was not a sufficient contact would not provide
the necessary nexus.
1 22
The Court concluded that there was a total absence of contacts,
ties, or relations with Oklahoma. The Court found that the "respon-
dents [sought] to base jurisdiction on one, isolated occurrence and
whatever inferences [could] be drawn therefrom: the fortuitous circum-
stances that a single Audi automobile, sold in New York to New York
residents, happened to suffer an accident while passing through
Oklahoma." 1
23
In applying the fair warning test the Court stated: "[W]hen a cor-
poration 'purposely avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities
within the forum State' it has clear notice that it is subject to suit there
... ,"124 The Court reasoned that when a defendant purposely "de-
livers its product into the stream of interstate commerce with the expec-
tation that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum State,"
then it does not offend due process for the forum state to assert its in
personam jurisdiction over the defendant. 25
118. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 585 P.2d 351, 354 (Okla. 1978).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 355.
121. 100 S.Ct. at 566.
122. Financial benefits accruing to the defendant from a collateral relation to the forum
state will not support jurisdiction if they do not stem from a constitutionally cognizable
contact with that State. In our view, whatever marginal revenues petitioners may receive
by virtue of the fact that their products are capable of use in Oklahoma is far too attenu-
ated a contact to justify that State's exercise of in personam jurisdiction over them.
Id. (citations omitted) (no emphasis added).
123. Id. at 564.
124. Id. at 567.
125. Id. (emphasis added). Therefore, decisions holding nonresident defendants subject to
jurisdiction on the basis of foreseeability of purchase of their product within the forum have been
found to withstand constitutional challenge. See, e.g., Gray v. American Radiator & Standard
Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961). But see Justice Brennan's dissenting opin-
1980]
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On the other hand, if the nonresident defendant can merely rea-
sonably foresee that at the time of introducing its product into the
stream of interstate commerce it might be used in the forum state, then
it does offend due process for the forum state to assert in personam
jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant. 26 Although previously re-
jecting foreseeability as a basis for finding the nexus necessary to assert
in personam jurisdiction, the Court did find it to be relevant in deter-
mining if the defendant had fair warning.1
27
In using foreseeability the Court shifted the focus from the likeli-
hood that the product might find its way into the forum to the reason-
able expectation that the defendant, owing to his activities within the
forum, should anticipate being haled into the forum to defend a suit. 28
The distinction being made by the Court is clear. The "unilateral ac-
tivity of those who claim some relationship with a nonresident defend-
ant" does- not provide the fair warning required by due process.
129
Only by purposely availing himself of the benefits of the forum state
does a nonresident defendant receive the fair warning required by due
process.
This is not to say that the benefits must be derived directly. In
fact, an economic benefit received through a chain of distribution,
though there may be many others through which that benefit flowed, is
sufficient to provide the fair warning required. 30 The Court found no
evidence that any of World-Wide's ultimate purchasers were residents
of Oklahoma. Therefore, the unilateral activity of the Robinsons, who
claimed a relationship with World-Wide, did not provide sufficient
contacts to allow Oklahoma to assert jurisdiction.
ion, where he could not reconcile the constitutional distinction "between a case involving goods
which reach the distant state through a chain of distribution and a case involving goods which
reach the same State because a consumer, using them as the dealer knew the customer would, took
them there." I00 S.Ct. at 584-85.
126. 100 S.Ct. at 567 (emphasis added). "It is foreseeable that the purchasers of automobiles
sold by World-Wide and Seaway may take them to Oklahoma. But the mere unilateral activity of
these who claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of
contact with the forum state." Id.
127. "[F]oreseeability that is critical to due process analysis is not the mere likelihood that the
product will find its way into the forum State. Rather, it is that the defendant's conduct and
connection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into
court there." Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. (quoting from Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
130. "The forum State does not exceed its powers under the Due Process Clause if it asserts
personal jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its products into the stream of commerce
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A number of factors have been recognized by the Court as being
relevant in applying the convenience test. In light of the purpose be-
hind the convenience test, to protect the defendant from litigating in a
distant or inconvenient forum, the primary concern is the burden
placed on the nonresident defendant. 3' In addition to this primary
concern, the Court has recognized as other relevant factors the forum's
interest to adjudicate the dispute, the plaintifs interest in obtaining
convenient and effective relief, the interest in obtaining the most effi-
cient resolution of the controversy, and the interest of the states to fur-
ther substantive social policies.' 32 After identifying the relevant factors
for consideration, the Court did not explore whether the defendants
would actually have been inconvenienced by defending the suit in
Oklahoma. Because the defendants did not have sufficient contacts,
ties, or relations with the forum, it was not necessary to consider the
convenience issue. The Court concluded:
Even if the defendant would suffer minimal or no inconve-
nience from being forced to litigate before the tribunals of an-
other State; even if the forum State has a strong interest in
applying its law to the controversy; even if the forum State is
the most convenient location for litigation, the Due Process
Clause, acting as an instrument of interstate federalism, may
sometimes act to divest the State of its power to render a valid
judgment.133
In dissent, Justice Marshall, who wrote the opinions of the Court
in Shaffer, Kulko, and Rush, showed concern that the majority in
World- Wide had taken an unnecessarily narrow view of the defend-
ant's contacts, ties, or relations with the forum state. ' 34 Marshall be-
lieved the nexus test was satisfied by the fact that the defendants chose
"to become part of a nationwide, indeed a global, network for market-
ing and servicing automobiles."'
131. The relationship between the defendant and the forum must be such that it is "rea-
sonable . . . to require the corporation to defend the particular suit which is brought
there.". . . Implicit in this emphasis on reasonableness is the understanding that the
burden on the defendant, while always aprimary concern, will in an appropriate case be
considered in light of other relevant factors ....
Id. at 564 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 565-66.
134. Id. at 568.
135. Id. at 569. Justice Marshall would agree with the majority and hold that the nexus test
was not satisfied if he believed the defendant's only forum-related conduct was the isolated event
of the automobile accident. He believed, however, that jurisdiction was premised on the "deliber-
ate and purposeful actions of the defendants. . . to become part of a nationwide, indeed a global,
network for marketing and servicing automobiles." Id.
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Justice Marshall agreed with the majority that if a product was
purchased in the forum state by a consumer, then that state could assert
in personam jurisdiction over anyone in the chain of distribution. 36
He strongly disagreed, however, with the majority's position "that ju-
risdiction is necessarily lacking if the product enters the state not
through the channels of distribution but in the course of its intended
use by the consumer."' 3 7 Owing to the unique characteristics of the
automobile, Marshall would have held that the nonresident defendants
purposefully availed themselves of the forum state's benefits and
thereby should have reasonably anticipated being haled before the fo-
rum court if the product entered the forum either through channels of
distribution or by the consumer's use of the product.'38 Although sym-
pathizing with the majority's concern that persons should be able to
structure their foreign activities so as not to be subject to suit in a dis-
tant forum, he believed that some activities, such as the automobile
industry, by their very nature subject persons to the jurisdiction of mul-
tiple forums.13
9
In the case of the distributor, in particular, the probability
that some of the cars it sells will be driven in every one of the
contiguous States must amount to a virtual certainty. This
knowledge should alert a reasonable businessman to the like-
lihood that a defect in the product might manifest itself in the
forum State-not because of some unpredictable, aberrant,
unilateral action by a single buyer, but in the normal course
of the operation of the vehicles for their intended purpose.
40
Justice Brennan, believing the standards set forth by the majority
were obsolete,' 4' wrote a dissenting opinion. Rather than inquiring
into the defendant's contacts, ties, or relations with the forum state,
Brennan felt that "[t]he essential inquiry in locating the constitutional
limits on state-court jurisdiction over absent defendants is whether the
particular exercise of jurisdiction offends 'traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice.' "142 Brennan suggests that the only reason
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. "[T]he intended use of the automobile is precisely as a means of traveling from one place
to another. In such a case, it is highly artificial to restrict the concept of the 'stream of commerce'
to the chain of distribution from the manufacturer to the ultimate consumer." Id. at 570.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 569.
141. World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 100 S. Ct. 580, 581 (1980). (Justice Brennan wrote
one dissenting opinion covering both World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson and Rush Y. Savchuk).
142. Id. (quoting from International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 362 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
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for inquiring into the existence of the defendant's contacts is to give
some content to the determination of whether the maintenance of the
suit is reasonable and fair.'43 The Constitution, he argued, does not
require the trial to be held in the forum with the best contacts with the
nonresident defendant. It only requires that the forum have some con-
tacts with the defendant."
Brennan, while suggesting that the constitutional standard should
be that of a convenience test, "would still require the plaintiff to
demonstrate sufficient contacts among the parties, the forum, and the
litigation to make the forum a reasonable State in which to hold the
trial."145
B. The Impact of Rush
The only relationship the United States Supreme Court found
among Rush, Minnesota, and the tort action was the fact that Rush's
insurance company, State Farm, did business in Minnesota. The Court
did not think this provided a sufficient nexus for asserting jurisdic-
tion. 46 In light of this, the Court rejected Seider, pointing out that it
had held in Shaffer that the mere presence of property in the forum
state that is unrelated to a plaintiff's cause of action does not establish a
sufficient relationship between the nonresident property owner, the
state, and the litigation to support the assertion of jurisdiction. 47 Be-
cause the property relied upon by the Minnesota court to provide the
basis for jurisdiction was not the subject matter of the case, nor related
to the Savchuk tort action, the Court held the assertion of quasi in rem
jurisdiction to be unconstitutional. 48
The Court also rejected the idea that viewing Seider as a direct
action proceeding was sufficient to provide the necessary nexus. It
143. Justice Brennan noted that the Court in International Shoe "declined to establish a
mechanical test based on the quantum of contacts between a State and the defendant. . . . The
existence of contacts, so long as there were some, was merely one way of giving content to the
determination of fairness and reasonableness." Id.
144. Id. at 582.
145. Id. at 587.
146. Rush v. Savchuk, 100 S.Ct. 571, 577-78 (1980).
147. Id.
148. The Court stated:
The insurance policy is not the subject matter of the case, however, nor is it related to the
operative facts of the negligence action. The contractual arrangements between the de-
fendant and the insurer pertain only to the conduct, not the substance of the litigation,
and accordingly do not affect the court's jurisdiction unless they demonstrate ties be-
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thought this approach was not the equivalent of a direct action against
the insurer because a court must first be able to obtain jurisdiction over
the nominal defendant, the insured. The Court found it conceptually
impossible for the forum to obtain jurisdiction over the insurer. ,49 In
many respects this reasoning by the Court ignores the practical effects
of a Seider direct action proceeding. 50 The Court was not willing to
ignore the question of jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant.
This may be attributed to its unwillingness to accept the lower court's
reasoning that the insured had only a slight interest in the litigation
and, therefore, it was not unfair to make him a nominal defendant in
order to obtain jurisdiction over the insurer.' 5 '
The lower court also attempted to establish the necessary nexus by
attributing to Rush those interests which Minnesota has in providing a
forum for its residents and joining them with State Farm's contacts.
Rather than focusing on the relationship among the defendant, the fo-
rum, and the litigation as the minimum contacts standard requires, the
Minnesota Supreme Court would make its inquiry based on the rela-
tionship "among the plaintiff, the forum, the insurer, and the litiga-
tion."15 2
The United States Supreme Court noted that such a shift in in-
quiry would result in asserting jurisdiction over a nonresident insured
on the basis of the insurer's activities within the forum, the state's inter-
est in providing a forum for its residents, and the plaintiff's contacts
with the forum. Asserting jurisdiction over a nonresident insured who
has no contacts, ties, or relations with the forum is "plainly unconstitu-
tional."'15 3
149. The State's ability to exert its power over the "nominal defendant" is analytically
prerequisite to the insurer's entry into the case as a garnishee. If the Constitution forbids
the assertion ofjurisdiction over the insured based on the policy, then there is no concep-
tual basis for bringing the "garnishee" into the action.
Id.
150. See notes 98-101 supra and accompanying text. See also Justice Brennan's dissenting
opinion, 100 S.Ct. at 583.
151. The Court said: "Because the party with forum contacts can only be reached through the
out of state party, the question ofjurisdiction over the nonresident cannot be ignored. Moreover,
the assumption that the defendant has no real stake in the litigation is far from self-evident."
Rush v. Savchuk, 100 S.Ct. 571, 579 (1980) (footnotes omitted). The Court identified a
noneconomic factor that may have great importance to a defendant. The cause of action may
cause people to question a defendant's integrity and competence and therefore affect his profes-
sional standing. Also, the defendant might have a substantial economic stake if "multiple plain-
tiffs sued in different states for an aggregate amount in excess of the policy limits, or if a successful
claim would affect the policyholder's insurability." Id. at 579 n.20.
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Since the assertion of jurisdiction by the Minnesota court did not
satisfy the nexus test of the minimum contacts standard, the Court did
not need to address the fair warning test or the convenience test. Nev-
ertheless, in passing, the Court did conclude that Rush, by simply hav-
ing bought insurance in Indiana, had not engaged in any purposeful
activity related to Minnesota such that he could have fair warning of
being haled before a Minnesota Court.'
54
Justice Brennan, in his dissenting opinion, again asserted the es-
sential inquiry to be "whether the particular exercise of jurisdiction of-
fends 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" The
factors Justice Brennan would consider in determining the fairness and
reasonableness of the exercise of state court jurisdiction are the various
interests in proceeding with the action in the forum, the actual burden
imposed on a nonresident defendant to defend the suit in the distant
forum, and the existence of the defendant's contacts, so long as there
were some.' 56 In considering these factors Justice Brennan arrived at a
two part test. "If a plaintiff can show that his chosen forum State has a
sufficient interest in the litigation (or sufficient contacts with the de-
fendant), then the defendant who cannot show some real injury to a
constitutionally protected interest . . . should have no constitutional
excuse not to appear."'' 57 In applying this test Justice Brennan con-
cluded that Rush should be required to defend in Minnesota. Minne-
sota had an interest in providing a forum for its residents and in
regulating the activities of insurance companies doing business in the




World- Wide Volkswagen and Rush leave intact the minimum con-
tacts test as the constitutional standard to be applied in determining the
propriety of a state court's assertion of jurisdiction. The cases are im-
154. Id. at 577-78. The Court found that State Farm's decision to do business in Minnesota or
in the other 49 states was of no concern to Rush. "He had no control over that decision, and it is
unlikely that he would have expected that by buying insurance in Indiana he had subjected him-
self to suit in any State to which a potential future plaintiff might decide to move." Id. at 577.
155. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 100 S. Ct. at 581. See note 144 supra and
accompanying text.
156. Id. at 581.
157. Id. at 587 (citation omitted). Justice Brennan believed that by forcing the defendant to
show some real injury to a constitutionally protected interest, it would "strip the defendant of an
unjustified veto power over" which forum had jurisdiction over him. Id.
158. Id. at 582-83.
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portant, however, in that the Court articulated the important factors
that must be present for the minimum contacts standard to be met.
This should alleviate a great deal of the confusion that has developed
from International Shoe and its progeny.
In order for the minimum contacts test to be met there must be: 1)
a sufficient relationship amongst the defendant, the forum, and the liti-
gation; 2) a purposeful availment by the defendant of the benefits of the
forum, such that he has fair warning of the possibility of being haled
before the forum's courts; and 3) no unreasonable inconvenience to the
defendant in being forced to defend the suit in the forum state. The
absence of any of these factors defeats the state assertion ofjurisdiction.
Curtis L. Craig
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